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Abstract
On a widely held view in aesthetics, appreciation requires disinterested attention. George 
Dickie famously criticized a version of this view championed by the aesthetic attitude 
theorists. I revisit his criticisms and extract an overlooked challenge for accounts that seek to 
characterize appreciative engagement in terms of distinctive motivation: at minimum, the 
motivational profile such accounts propose must make a difference to how appreciative 
episodes unfold over time. I then develop a proposal to meet this challenge by drawing an 
analogy between how attention is guided in appreciation and how practical action is guided 
in ‘striving play’—a mode of game play recently foregrounded in the philosophy of games. 
On the resulting account appreciation involves an ‘inverted’ motivational structure: the 
appreciating agent’s attention is guided by cognitive goals taken up instrumentally, for the 
sake of the cognitive activity that results from attending under the guidance of those goals. 
Keywords: aesthetic attitude, disinterest, attention, goal-directed thought, game play
I. INTRODUCTION
According  to  a  contemporary  version  of  the  disinterest  thesis  in  aesthetics,  appreciation 
requires disinterested or non-instrumentally motivated attention. That is, to engage with an 
item appreciatively, one must attend to it ‘without ulterior purpose’, ‘for its own sake’, or ‘for 
the sake of the very experience of attending to it’ (see for example Stolnitz 1960; Iseminger 
2005; Stecker 2006; Levinson 2016).
The thought that disinterest qualifies a way of attending instead of, as Kant (1790/2000) 
had  it,  a  type  of  pleasure  or  judgment,  originated  with  the  aesthetic  attitude  theorists. 
Schopenhauer (1819/2010: 231) provides an early articulation when he locates the value of 
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the aesthetic attitude in how it ‘lifts us out of the endless stream of willing, tearing cognition 
from its  slavery to the will’,  such that  ‘attention is  no longer directed to the motives of 
willing.’ The later aesthetic attitude theorists took up this thread. For Bullough (1912: 89), for 
example, aesthetic appreciation involves ‘putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear 
with our practical, actual self’ and ‘allowing it to stand outside the context of our personal 
needs and ends’. For Stolnitz (1960: 32–36), the aesthetic attitude requires both disinterest, 
which he understood to mean a lack of any motive other than just to attend, and what he 
called ‘sympathy’,  which entails not imposing one’s own preconceptions on the object of 
attention.
Aesthetic attitude theory’s heyday around the mid-twentieth century was short lived, 
however, and many now credit George Dickie’s (1964) paper, ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic 
Attitude’, with sounding its death knell. But despite Dickie’s role in curtailing the attitude 
theorists’ influence, his attack on the very existence of a disinterested mode of attention has 
failed to engender consensus. A chorus of dissenting voices, several of them recent (Lind 
1980; Zangwill 1992; Kemp 1999; Shelley 2017; Levinson 2016: 28–31; Nanay 2016: 20–
21; Matthen 2017, 2018), has helped the notion of an appreciative mode of attention, marked 
by its own peculiar motivational profile, to outlive its theoretical beginnings.
Dickie’s critics are right to point out that his attack on the existence of a disinterested 
mode of attention was inconclusive. But pointing this out falls short of meeting the challenge 
his  arguments  pose.  In  particular,  there  is  still  no  informative  positive  analysis  in  the 
literature of what ‘attending for its own sake’ amounts to, capable of bearing the explanatory 
weight routinely thrust upon the notion. The current paper takes up this challenge. It does so 
by revisiting Dickie’s arguments and extracting from them an overlooked desideratum for 
accounts that seek to understand appreciation in terms of a distinctive motivational profile. 
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Once this desideratum is clearly articulated (in section II), the aim will be to develop a model 
of appreciative motivation that meets it (sections III–V).
Two caveats are in order at the outset. What follows should not be construed as an 
attempt  at  a  complete  theory  of  appreciation,  and  even  less  so  a  theory  of  aesthetic 
appreciation. For a start, even if we were to grant the attitude theorists that a non-instrumental 
mode of attention is necessary for engaging in appreciation, this does not yet imply that it 
would be sufficient. Hence, the account will provide a model only of the appreciative mode 
of attention as put forward by the aesthetic attitude theorists. There will at most be some hints 
and suggestions about how the mental kind picked out by the account should feature in a 
complete  picture  of  the  grab  bag  of  phenomena  that  sometimes  go  under  the  label  of 
appreciation. Implicit in the background is the assumption that this mental kind is indeed 
central to such a picture, but the task of providing the full picture is beyond this paper’s 
remit.1
Second,  even  if  we  find,  contra  Dickie,  that  something  in  the  vicinity  of  a  non-
instrumental mode of attention is a real and commonplace mental phenomenon, why think 
that  its  occurrence  would  track  the  aesthetic  domain?  Attending  to  an  item  non-
instrumentally, whatever we take that to entail, plausibly (or even likely) comes apart from 
ascribing aesthetic value to the item, and from attending to all or any of its aesthetic features. 
In other words, Dickie was right that we should not assume, as the aesthetic attitude theorists 
arguably did, that an account of the appreciative mode of attention could furnish an easy 
answer to the question of how the domain of the aesthetic is to be demarcated from other 
domains. For this reason the account developed below intentionally leaves open—indeed, it 
invites the conclusion—that there is a double dissociation between the appreciative mode of 
 There is of course also a rich history of positive accounts of appreciation that do not invoke a 1
distinctive non-instrumental mode of attention at all. These are not targets of this paper’s arguments.
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attention on the one hand, and aesthetic cognition on the other. We can engage appreciatively 
with non-aesthetic features of the world, and we can experientially register aesthetic values 
and properties without thereby realizing the motivational profile underlying the appreciative 
mode of attention.
Despite these caveats,  and notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, this paper’s 
aims retain a deep continuity with the aesthetic attitude theorists’ views. Broadly speaking, 
they believed that there is a distinctive mode or manner of attending that is pivotal to our 
aesthetic lives, that this mode supervenes on how our attention is motivated, and that it is 
possible to give a general account of the motivation that grounds it. What follows agrees with 
these commitments (at least thus formulated).
But where the attitude theorists construed appreciative attention in terms of a subject’s 
ascription of final (that is, non-instrumental) value to the object of their attention, or to their 
own attentional engagement with it, the proposal below will be that no such final valuing is 
required. Instead, the sense in which appreciative attention is non-instrumentally motivated 
resides in how the appreciating subject selects cognitive goals not merely for the sake of the 
broader ends those goals’ attainment serves, but rather for the sake of ends served by the 
process  of  being engaged in  the  cognitive  activity  that  results  from those  goals’ pursuit. 
Unlike in everyday cognition, the motivational relationship of means to ends is inverted in 
the appreciating subject’s cognitive engagement with the world.
This proposal will be thoroughly unpacked below, but the argument starts with Dickie’s 
challenge to the attitude theorists.
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II. DICKIE’S CHALLENGE
Crucial  to  the  aesthetic  attitude  theorists’ project  is  the  feasibility  of  distinguishing  in  a 
principled way between disinterested (or non-instrumental) and interested (or instrumental) 
modes  of  attention.  The  gist  of  Dickie’s  complaint  is  that  they  conflate  this  distinction, 
between different species of attention, with a distinction between different kinds of motives 
for which one may attend.
Take one of Dickie’s examples: Smith and Jones both listen to a piece of music, Jones 
with the aim of remembering its details for an exam the next day, and Smith with no such 
ulterior  purpose.  The thought  is  that,  on the aesthetic  attitude theorists’ criterion,  Jones’s 
practical interest in the exam would get in the way of his simply savouring the music. Smith, 
on the other hand, can listen unencumbered and, provided he attends closely, his attention can 
rise to the level of aesthetic appreciation. Of this example Dickie (1964: 58) writes that ‘what 
initially appears to be a perceptual distinction—listening in a certain way (interestedly or 
disinterestedly)—turns out to be a motivational or intentional distinction—listening for or 
with a  certain purpose.’ Disparate motives for  attending,  he argues,  are not  sufficient  for 
disparate modes of attention: ‘There is only one way to listen to (to attend to) music, although 
the listening may be more or less attentive and there may be a variety of motives, intentions, 
and reasons for doing so’ (ibid.).
Dickie’s  argument  for  this  conclusion consists  of  a  series  of  intuition pumps,  each 
involving a subject whose attention would, like that of Jones, putatively count as interested 
on the attitude theorists’ criterion. In each case, Dickie proclaims, there is either no difference 
between the subject’s  attention and that  of  a  disinterested subject  at  all,  or,  if  there  is  a 
difference, it is in what they are attending to rather than the manner of their attention. The 
impresario at  the theatre taking pleasure in the size of  the audience,  for  example,  is  not 
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attending to the play interestedly, but is attending to the till instead (ibid.: 58–9). The reader 
approaching a poem solely for diagnostic evidence of the author’s neuroses, is at worst a case 
of attention to the author instead of the poem, and at best, a case of partial attention to the 
poem (ibid.: 60). Thus, the argument goes, the distinction the attitude theorists are tracking, 
in so far as they are tracking any distinction at  all,  is  not one between disinterested and 
interested modes of attention, but rather one between attention and distraction.
Whether we buy this line of argument depends on whether we share Dickie’s intuitions 
in the pertinent cases, about who is attending to what, and how. The problem is that questions 
about who is attending to what are not always straightforward. In work on the nature of 
attention,  Mole  (2011)  makes  this  point  by  emphasizing  that  questions  about  an  agent’s 
attention are connected to questions about which perceptual, cognitive, and practical tasks 
they  are  engaged  in.  In  laboratory  conditions,  honing  in  on  which  task  a  group  of 
experimental  subjects  is  engaged  in  is  a  matter  of  experimental  design.  But  the  same 
precision is not available in thought experiments involving agents in ordinary circumstances:
Outside  of  the  lab  an  agent’s  tasks  will  tend  to  be  more  numerous, 
complex, nested, and overlapping. As a result the question ‘What task is 
this agent performing?’, when asked outside the lab, may admit of many 
answers,  some of  which  are  only  vaguely  true.  […]  [A]nswers  to  the 
question  ‘To  what  is  this  agent  attending?’ will  inherit  some  of  this 
vagueness. (Mole 2011: 52)
In as much as Dickie’s arguments depend, then, on clear verdicts about what the subjects in 
his  cases  are  attending  to,  there  is  room for  disagreement.  And if  vagueness  besets  our 
intuitions concerning what  an agent in ordinary circumstances is attending to, we at least 
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need an argument for thinking that our intuitions about whether two agents are attending in 
the same way are any more probative. Dickie’s critics have not been remiss in pointing this 
out. About the Smith and Jones example, Shelley (2017) writes:
The  contention  that  Jones  and  Smith  are  attending  in  the  same  way 
appears to be question-begging, as it evidently depends on a principle of 
individuation  that  the  attitude  theorist  rejects:  if  Jones’s  attention  is 
governed by some ulterior purpose and Smith’s is not, and we individuate 
attention according to the purpose that governs it, their attention is not the 
same.
To accept Dickie’s argument, in other words, we must first accept his contention that the 
mode of attention exemplified in an attentional episode is not determined by the purpose that 
motivates the attending in that episode. But this is precisely what is under contention in his 
dispute with the attitude theorists. Besides his discussion of the sample of cases, Dickie offers 
no argument for his restrictive standard for differentiating between attentional episodes.
What arguments could he offer? To answer this question, we need an account of the 
relation between an attentional episode, and the purpose that motivates it. We can understand 
this relation in one of two ways, each corresponding to a major conception of how purposeful 
behaviours  in  general  relate  to  their  goals.  Davidson  (1963)  famously  holds  that  what 
distinguishes purposeful behaviours (actions) from mere bodily movements is that they are 
caused  in  the  right  way  by  their  agents’ beliefs  and  desires.  Frankfurt  (1978)  criticizes 
Davidson’s  belief-desire  account  of  action.  On  the  alternative  he  proposes,  calling  a 
behaviour purposeful entails nothing about how it is initiated or caused, but rather that it is 
guided or kept on track by its purpose as it unfolds.
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Much has been written on this dispute in action theory and, in retrospect, it seems clear 
that  one  could  make  a  Davidsonian  account  of  action  compatible  with  Frankfurt’s  by 
incorporating a more sophisticated notion of causation than the one Frankfurt’s criticisms 
assume (see Setiya 2003: 348, n.11). But the point here is not to take sides or resolve the 
dispute;  it  is  to  highlight  the  difference  in  emphasis  between  the  two  views—one  on 
causation, the other on guidance. We can use the contrast between the two views to articulate 
two  different  ways  an  attentional  episode  could  relate  to  its  goal  or  purpose.  On  a 
Davidsonian picture, to attend for a particular purpose would be for one’s attending to have 
been caused by the appropriate beliefs and desires regarding that purpose. On a Frankfurtian 
picture, it would be for one’s attention to be guided by that purpose as it unfolds.2
Return now to Dickie’s standard for individuating modes of attention. His insistence 
that they are not differentiated by the purposes that motivate an attentional episode makes 
perfect  sense on the  Davidsonian picture.  If  motivation concerns  just  how an attentional 
episode is initiated or caused (in the sense of a triggering cause), then one episode can be 
intrinsically identical—that is, identical in contents to which the subject attends—to another 
episode  with  very  different  motivation  (read:  causal  antecedents).  For  two  differently 
motivated  episodes  to  differ  in  mode,  we  need  to  understand  their  motivation  on  the 
Frankfurtian picture instead, in terms of what guides the course of an episode as it unfolds. If 
motivation  is  a  matter  of  guidance,  then  a  difference  in  type  of  motivation  can  yield  a 
difference in the mode of attention an episode instantiates.
Just as an instance of purposeful physical behaviour may be identical in all its intrinsic 
properties to a set of mere bodily movements not  guided by the agent, so two attentional 
episodes may in principle be identical in all of their contents while only one has the contents 
 The idea of applying a Frankfurtian notion of guidance to episodes of attention to capture 2
common sense distinctions between mental kinds is due to Irving (2016: 563–4), who uses it in an 
account of the nature of mind-wandering.
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it does because of the right kind of guidance. As in the former case, of purposeful behaviour 
versus mere bodily movement, we surely want to maintain the distinction between types of 
attentional  episodes  that  are  differently  guided.  Thus  the  notion  of  a  distinctive  way  of 
attending, corresponding to a distinctive motivation—or, more specifically, a distinctive kind 
of attentional guidance—remains a live possibility despite Dickie’s insistence to the contrary.
None  of  this  is  to  say  that  Dickie’s  arguments  are  inconsequential.  In  fact,  once 
understood in this way, they pose a challenge to any feasible analysis of the appreciative 
motivational profile.  They show that such an analysis will  have to specify the distinctive 
motivation of appreciative episodes in the Frankfurtian guidance sense.  It  will  not do to 
specify  a  characteristic  type  of  reason  for  which  appreciators  attend  to  the  object  of 
appreciation. Rather, what is required is a characteristic type of purpose by which, or manner 
in  which,  attention  to  an  object  is  guided  as  appreciative  episodes  unfold  over  time. 
Appreciative  motivation,  if  there  is  such  a  thing,  should  help  explain  why  appreciative 
episodes proceed as they do, rather than merely why they are engaged in at all. Until now 
Dickie’s critics have failed to recognizes this challenge, let alone attempted to meet it.3
One  reason  the  challenge  has  some  real  traction  is  that  while  the  standard 
characterizations of appreciative motivation—using locutions like attending ‘disinterestedly’, 
‘non-instrumentally’,  or  ‘without  ulterior  purpose’—admit  of  quite  natural  Davidsonian 
readings, they do not admit of equally obvious Frankfurtian readings. This is in part because 
they are contrastive rather than positive, prohibiting certain kinds of motivations or purposes 
 A possible exception is Matthen (2017, 2018), whose account of appreciative (or aesthetic) 3
motivation does imply a link between an attentional episode’s motivation and how it unfolds. There is 
much to like about Matthen’s account, but the account developed in this paper differs from his in 
several respects: it gives a non-hedonic reading of appreciative motivation; it shifts the focus to 
guidance implemented by deliberate attentional constraints (see section V); and, unlike Matthen’s 
view, it does not tie appreciative motivation to fluent cognitive processing (Matthen 2018: 24).
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(interested, instrumental, and ulterior ones).  But a Frankfurtian account of the motivational 4
profile these locutions pick out should specify how attention is guided, and settling on which 
goals or purposes it may not be guided by, does not yet much constrain how attention must be 
guided to count as appreciative.
The challenge,  then,  is  to give a positive account of appreciative motivation which 
could help explain why cognition unfolds as it does in appreciation. The rest of this paper 
develops such an account via an analogy with a practical activity we often do engage in ‘for 
its own sake’: playing games. The next section introduces the notion of ‘striving play’, a 
special form of game play that has been the focus of recent work in the philosophy of games 
(section III). Looking further ahead, the plan will be to show that striving play amounts to a 
genuinely distinctive practical mode of engaging in games (section IV) and then to argue that 
striving play’s practical motivational structure is isomorphic to the cognitive motivational 
structure by which attention is guided in episodes of appreciative engagement (section V).
III. STRIVING PLAY
In what is  by now a classic work in the philosophy of games,  Bernard Suits  (1978: 55) 
defines game play as ‘the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’. The point of 
our efforts  in playing a game is  not just  to achieve the goal the game prescribes,  but to 
achieve it under prescribed limitations. Suits expresses the thought in terms of a distinction 
between a game’s lusory and prelusory goals (ibid.: 36–7). The in-game (lusory) goal of a 
bicycle race is not just to reach the finishing line first (the prelusory goal), but to reach it 
using only the permitted means (in this case, cycling along a prescribed route). Note that the 
 Note that the formulation ‘attending for its own sake’ is also naturally read contrastively: as 4
ruling out cases of attending for something else’s sake. That is, to attend for its own sake is to attend 
because one attributes final (rather than instrumental) value to doing so.
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prelusory goal can be specified independently of the game’s existence, but the lusory goal 
owes its existence to the game as constituted by the combination of the prelusory goal and the 
pertinent restrictions on means. On Suits’s definition, all games have this structure, of pursuit 
of a lusory goal that is constituted by the combination of a prelusory goal and rules restricting 
efficient means.
One may doubt the definition’s extensional adequacy, but the model of game play Suits 
develops in the process of defending it generates illuminating descriptions of many game-
related phenomena.  In  recent  work inspired by Suits,  Nguyen (forthcoming:  ch.  1)  takes 
advantage of this fact by suggesting that the set of games that satisfy Suits’s definition—call 
them ‘Suitsian games’—can be approached as an independently interesting topic of inquiry, 
whether or not it coincides with the set that ordinary usage categorizes under ‘games’. For 
Nguyen (ibid.), the ‘most interesting possibility raised by the Suitsian analysis’ is the form of 
engagement in Suitsian games he calls striving play.
III.1. Two distinctions in game play
To distinguish striving play from other forms of play, consider the diversity of reasons for 
which one might engage in a Suitsian game. Sometimes we play sudoku just for the sake of 
distracting ourselves on the morning commute. Wagering games and professional sports show 
that often money and social  prestige figure into players’ reasons for playing a game. We 
might play a sport for the sake of our physical health. Or perhaps the feeling of winning is all 
the  reward  we  need.  In  fact,  we  can  be  maximally  pluralist  about  potential  reasons  for 
engaging in games. Taking up a game’s prelusory goal (the game-independent state to be 
achieved) and constitutive rules (the restrictions on means) is done for the same proximal 
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reason across all cases: to make possible the activity of playing the game. But, as constituted, 
a game’s (in-game) lusory goal can be pursued for any number of reasons.
Nguyen (ibid.: ch. 3) argues that these reasons vary along two dimensions. Firstly he 
distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic play, a distinction pertaining to whether a player 
ultimately engages in the game for goods internal or external to it. Secondly, both intrinsic 
and extrinsic players may differ with regard to the locus within game play to which the values 
they pursue, adhere. Nguyen dubs this the distinction between achievement and striving play: 
a player may care either for goods associated with the achieving of the game’s lusory goal 
(winning) or for goods associated with the activity or process of attempting to achieve it. The 
two distinctions crosscut, yielding four types of play.
Intrinsic  achievement  players  care  non-instrumentally  for  winning;  they  are  pure 
competitors. Extrinsic achievement players care for the instrumental benefits of winning, like 
money or social prestige. Extrinsic striving players care for game-independent benefits that 
result from being engaged in the in-game activity, such as the fitness or health that result from 
playing sport,  cognitive skills  acquired by playing chess,  or  the distraction to be had by 
working  at  the  crossword.  Finally,  intrinsic  striving  players  care  non-instrumentally  for 
engagement in the in-game activity.5
Now consider how Nguyen’s two motivational distinctions may be used to give two 
different readings of what it means to play a game for its own sake. On one reading, to play a 
game for its own sake is to engage in intrinsic play: to play for the sake of goods internal to 
the  game.  The  distinction  between  extrinsic  and  intrinsic  play  presupposes  a  working 
conception of what it means to participate in a game for non-instrumental reasons. Elsewhere 
in value theory this kind of non-instrumental motivation is couched in the terminology of 
 Nguyen (ibid.) rightly notes that these categories are not exclusive. In real world cases our 5
reasons for engaging in games are typically mixed.
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final value (Korsgaard 1983; Kagan 1998). Intrinsic players ascribe final value to the game, 
whereas extrinsic players value it  instrumentally.  As final  value is  typically equated with 
value something has ‘for its own sake’, this makes it natural to understand intrinsic play as 
the paradigm case of game play for its own sake.
But notice that whether we are intrinsic or extrinsic players of a game—whether or not 
we attribute final value to it—is a matter of our motives for playing the game at all. The 
distinction pertains to why we take up the prelusory goal and rules of the game voluntarily, to 
whether we do so in pursuit of goods internal or external to the game we thereby constitute. 
Thus, the explanatory purchase that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic play gives 
us is limited to our actions with respect to the game, as opposed to our actions within the 
game. It answers questions such as why we play this game rather than that one, or why we 
spend as much time on a certain game as we do, but not questions about why our in-game 
pursuit of the lusory goal proceeds as it does.
What the discussion of Dickie’s challenge in the last section showed is that an account 
of appreciative motivation should provide explanatory purchase not just on why appreciative 
episodes are initiated (how they are caused), but on why they unfold as they do. We want an 
account of appreciative motivation in the Frankfurtian sense. But an analogy with intrinsic 
play would be ill suited to delivering such explanation. The notion of intrinsic play gives us 
only a causal, Davidsonian account of play for its own sake—it explains why we play rather 
than why our playing goes as it does. This paper’s central hypothesis is that the sense in 
which appreciative attention is non-instrumentally motivated is better captured by an analogy 
with  striving  play  than  intrinsic  play.  Ascribing  final  value  to  an  episode  of  cognitive 
engagement (in the way the intrinsic player ascribes final value to the game) turns out to be 
neither necessary nor sufficient for realizing the appreciative motivational profile.
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III.2. Striving play as play for its own sake
Part  of  what makes striving play interesting is  that  it  demands a kind of reversal  of  our 
ordinary  means-ends  engagement  in  practical  life.  Nguyen  (forthcoming)  calls  this  a 
‘motivational inversion’, but the motivational structure underlying striving play is perhaps 
equally well understood as a feedback loop.
Suitsian game play in general (including both striving and achievement play) already 
involves a kind of inversion of means and ends. To constitute a game, one must take up the 
prelusory goal as an instrument. In a bicycle race, being at the finishing line is worth pursuing 
only in as much as pursuing it helps to bring about the game. If being at the finishing line (the 
prelusory goal) were too highly valued independently of the race (the restricted pursuit of the 
prelusory goal),  then we would take the shortcut by taxi instead of cycling the long way 
around. The prelusory goal is thus, paradoxically, an ‘end’ that a Suitsian game player takes 
up as a means to constituting the game.
But not all participation in Suitsian games is striving play. The achievement player’s 
reasons for  taking up the prelusory goal  (and thereby constituting the game) involve the 
potential  benefits  of  winning,  whereas  the  striving  player’s  reasons  involve  benefits  that 
accrue from being engaged in the in-game activity, independently of success within the game. 
This does not mean that she can be entirely indifferent to winning, because the activity she 
cares  to  be  engaged  in  just  is  the  sincere  pursuit  of  the  game’s  lusory  goal.  Like  the 
achievement player, she must be submerged in the game to the extent that the lusory goal 
takes  on  motivational  salience  prompting  real  attempts  to  achieve  it  (more  on  this 
‘submersion requirement’ in the next section). But her overall motivational relation to the 
lusory goal differs from the achievement player’s. Whereas the achievement player’s pursuit 
of  the  lusory  goal  is  nested  in  a  broader,  game-independent  interest  in  maximizing 
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achievement, the striving player’s pursuit of the lusory goal is nested in a broader, game-
independent interest in activities like the one constituted by the very attempt to achieve the 
game’s lusory goal.
This,  then,  is  the  sense  in  which  the  striving  player  engages  in  a  game  non-
instrumentally: it is not that she ascribes final value to either the in-game activity or in-game 
achievement (like the intrinsic player), but rather that her interest in achievement within the 
game is motivationally grounded in a more fundamental interest in being engaged in the in-
game activity constituted by the pursuit of that achievement. The pursuit of achievement thus 
has a role both as a means and as an end in the striving player’s global motivational set. This 
yields  a  motivational  feedback  loop.  The  in-game  activity  can  still  be  characterized  in 
perfectly vanilla means-ends instrumental terms, as activity in service of winning, but the 
attempt to win, to achieve the lusory goal, can in turn be understood as a means to the further, 
game-independent end of being engaged in the in-game activity of its pursuit. In a sense then, 
the  striving  player’s  in-game  activity,  while  proximally  aimed  at  winning,  is  ultimately 
activity enacted in its own pursuit (or, if you will, for its own sake!).
Crucially, this feedback loop conception of the non-instrumental motivation that marks 
striving  play  (if  ‘non-instrumental’ is  indeed  an  apt  term  for  it)  differs  from  the  non-
instrumental motivation of intrinsic play. Intrinsic play requires that the in-game goods for 
which a player plays are final goods. No further rational grounds may be invoked to explain 
why an intrinsic player pursues either the in-game activity or the in-game achievement. But 
striving players can be intrinsic or extrinsic players. Their reasons for pursuing a particular 
game’s in-game activity may involve valuing that activity intrinsically, but it may also be 
thoroughly integrated with the rest of their practical projects outside the game. As long as 
their interest in winning is motivationally less fundamental than their interest in the in-game 
activity that is the pursuit of winning, nothing prevents that latter interest from being further 
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grounded in some other, more fundamental global goals (like getting fit, escaping boredom, 
gaining skills, etc.).
Nguyen’s account of striving play thus illuminates an interesting sense of engaging in 
an activity ‘for its own sake’—one which allows but does not require ascribing final value to 
the activity. Moreover, nothing in his account is inimical to the possibility of the same kind of 
motivational inversion or feedback loop involved in striving play occurring outside of the 
artificial practical context of Suitsian game play (for instance, in everyday cognitive activities 
picked  out  at  a  more  basic  level).  The  question  that  concerns  us  now  is  whether  the 
motivational model provided by striving play could be better suited to the current aim of 
meeting Dickie’s challenge than the model provided by intrinsic play.
Plausibly, unlike intrinsic play, striving play is not just a matter of what explains our 
actions with respect to the game, but also of how our in-game pursuit of the lusory goal is 
guided, and hence, it could serve as a model for how attention is guided in appreciation. But 
there is a complication: the ‘submersion requirement’ on Suitsian game play puts pressure on 
the idea that the striving player’s interest in striving makes a difference to how her in-game 
actions are guided.
IV. THE SUBMERSION REQUIREMENT
To be engaged in a game—to have accepted its prelusory goal and constitutive rules—is what 
Suits (1971: 38–41, 142–146) refers to as being in the lusory attitude. Sustaining the lusory 
attitude is required of achievement and striving players alike. Nguyen (forthcoming: ch. 1) 
offers a strong reading of what this entails: “To play a game is to behave, during the game, as 
if the pre-lusory goal were a final end. To be gripped by the game, to be absorbed by it, we 
must be able to enter the phenomenal state of holding the pre-lusory goal as a final end.”
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It is not that the prelusory goal should actually figure as a final end in the player’s 
global motivational set, but that she must temporarily induce in herself a state in which she is 
practically motivated by it as if it were, so that the activity that constitutes the game can 
emerge. Let us stick with the terminology Nguyen introduces for entering this phenomenal 
state—being ‘submerged’ in the practical perspective the game prescribes—and call this the 
submersion requirement on Suitsian game play.
The submersion requirement arguably imposes a greater demand on the striving player 
than the achievement player. When an achievement player enters a game, the prelusory goal 
presumably takes on and retains motivational salience for them directly and automatically, as 
means  to  the  achievement  goods  they  are  after.  Parsed  in  Nguyen’s  terminology:  the 
prelusory goal automatically takes on the guise of a final end with respect to an achievement 
player’s in-game actions. By contrast, the goods that the striving player is after attend the 
lusory  goal’s  pursuit  regardless  of  whether  that  pursuit  succeeds.  The  problem is  that  a 
complete  lack  of  interest  in  goods  attending  the  lusory  goal’s  successful  achievement 
threatens to undermine the normative traction of the prelusory goal on the player’s actions.
Nguyen (ibid.) illustrates the problem with an anecdote of a child playing Monopoly 
with his father and enjoying each time he wins game money so much that,  whenever he 
approaches victory, he hands his father some of his own game money in order to extend the 
game. Although a parent might humour their child in this situation, there is an important 
sense in which they have then given up playing Monopoly. This is an instance of a more 
general  predicament—call  it  the  Monopoly  trap—in which  a  player’s  interest  in  striving 
undermines their wholehearted pursuit of the prelusory goal.
The  Monopoly  trap  is  Nguyen’s  reason  for  construing  the  lusory  attitude  as  a 
comprehensive submersion in the practical perspective the game prescribes. On his strong 
construal,  submersion,  for  the  striving  player,  requires  completely  disengaging  from the 
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motivational pull of her broader interest in striving, even while her ultimate reason for doing 
so  just  is  to  find  herself  engaged  in  striving.  Notice,  however,  that  this  rules  out  any 
principled difference between how the achievement and striving players’ in-game actions are 
guided.  What  differentiates  them—their  respective  interests  in  achievement  and  striving 
goods—is relegated by a strong submersion requirement to figuring only in their reasons for 
entering and exiting the lusory attitude, and hence, to explaining their actions with respect to 
rather  than  within  the  game.  But  this  would  make  striving  play,  like  intrinsic  play,  an 
unsuitable model for building a Frankfurtian account of the appreciative motivational profile 
in terms of how attention is guided in appreciative episodes.
The crucial  question,  then,  is  whether  the Monopoly  trap really necessitates  such a 
strong construal of submersion. There is reason to think that it does not. To see why, first 
consider  achievement  play.  The  achievement  player  faces  no  Monopoly  trap,  no  tension 
between their pursuit of achievement goods and their experience of the game’s prelusory goal 
as motivationally akin to a final end. The hazard for the achievement player is in fact the 
converse of the Monopoly trap; it is that their interest in achievement might undermine the 
normative  traction not  of  the  prelusory goal,  but  of  the  game’s  restrictions  on permitted 
means. In this vicinity lies the temptation to cheat: to pursue the game’s prelusory goal by 
flouting the game’s constitutive rules.
The hazard of cheating does not, however, give us reason to construe the submersion 
requirement strongly, at least not as a constitutive condition on achievement play. As a matter 
of course, we do not expect achievement players to disengage completely from the guiding 
influence  of  their  game-independent  interest  in  achievement  goods.  On  the  contrary,  the 
particulars of expected achievement goods typically do (and should!) make a difference to 
how achievement players play. When the stakes are high, skilled achievement players play to 
the percentages; when the stakes are low, they might opt for more risky but showy play. 
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Game play does not break down until the interest in achievement puts sufficient pressure on a 
player’s capacity to support the lusory attitude. Only such complete breakdowns of the game
—when guidance by the aim to achieve renders a player’s in-game actions incompatible with 
simultaneous  guidance  by  the  lusory  goal—should  be  ruled  out  by  the  submersion 
requirement.
Much the same goes for the striving player. The Monopoly trap should not lead us to 
require a complete disengagement from the broader interest in striving. Striving play only 
breaks down when guidance by that interest defeats the motivational traction of the prelusory 
goal  and  thereby  renders  the  player’s  in-game  actions  incompatible  with  simultaneous 
guidance by the game’s lusory goal. A strong submersion requirement rules out too much. 
Game-independent  interests  in  achievement  or  striving  may  make  a  difference  to  how a 
player’s in-game pursuit of that goal unfolds, as long as this does not interfere excessively 
with the motivational traction that the constitutive rules and prelusory goal have on their 
actions.
This more moderate reading of the submersion requirement leaves us with a picture of 
the  difference  between  achievement  and  striving  play  as  not  merely  a  matter  of  what 
motivates a player to take up the lusory attitude, but also of how their in-game pursuit of the 
lusory goal unfolds. The moderate reading thus clears the way to use striving play as analogy 
for building a Frankfurtian account of appreciative motivation.
V. FROM STRIVING PLAY TO APPRECIATION
The last two sections showed that striving play amounts to an interesting sense of game play 
‘for its own sake’ and that, unlike intrinsic play, it finds expression in how episodes of game 
 19
play unfold. What remains is to generalizes the motivational structure underlying striving 
play to how attention is guided in cognitive activities centred on objects of appreciation.
Attentional  guidance  can  best  be  thought  of  in  terms  of  the  constraints  on  how 
cognition unfolds over time. Such constraints come in broadly two kinds (Christoff et al. 
2016): automatic constraints, for instance habitual cues and mechanisms of perceptual and 
affective  salience,  that  influence  where  our  attention  is  directed  without  our  executive 
control; and deliberate constraints, implemented by our executive functions in service of our 
goals. It is the presence of deliberate attentional constraints in appreciation—its involving 
goal-directed thought—that makes it amenable to the analogy with striving play. We can start 
by spelling out striving play’s side of the analogy.
The  crux  of  striving  play  lies  in  the  player’s  complex  motivational  relation  to  the 
game’s lusory goal. Striving players differ from achievement players with regard to the focus 
of the broader goals that rationalize their having and being guided by the intention to achieve 
the lusory goal. It is a difference, in other words, between the hierarchical goal structures 
within which their respective commitments to achieving the lusory goal is nested.
Goal-guided endeavours of almost any level of complexity involves some hierarchical 
nesting of tasks. If I am rational, the intention to have friends for dinner would typically lead 
to further intentions to complete tasks that I  consider ways of accomplishing the goal of 
dinner with friends. I have to invite them, check my refrigerator, decide what to serve, go to 
the grocery store, etc. Commitment to each subtask counts as a move guided by the broader 
intention,  and  the  subtasks  figure  in  ways  of  accomplishing  that  intention—they  are 
motivationally nested in the intention. Subtasks can be further divided as ways of completing 
them correspond to more nested intentions formed lower down the hierarchy (to invite my 
friends, I have to first get up off the couch to go get my phone, etc.). The initial overarching 
intention can also be formed under guidance of yet broader personal goals (seeing my friends 
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more often, introducing two of them to each other, etc.). Goals higher up in the hierarchy 
serve to guide, and, in good cases, rationally justify, the tasks of achieving nested goals lower 
down.
This gives us a general way to characterize achievement and striving play as modes of 
Suitsian game play. Both kinds of players share a commitment to achieving the game’s lusory 
goal,  which  in  Suitsian  game  play  is  represented  by  a  personal  level  mental  state  (an 
intention).  Both  probably  have  multiple  broader  goals  higher  up  their  motivational 
hierarchies  served  by  engaging  in  the  game,  some of  which  perhaps  guided  their  initial 
decision to play the game. The discussion of the submersion requirement in the last section 
showed that, in order for there to be a difference in their mode of play, they cannot differ just 
with respect to which goals higher up the hierarchy secure their commitment to the lusory 
goal; there must also be a difference in which goals higher up influence how they go about 
pursuing the lusory goal. Thus the striving player’s in-game moves and decisions must, for 
some part of their pursuit of the lusory goal, be under active guidance not just of commitment 
to the lusory goal, but also of a goal higher up their motivational hierarchy that stands to be 
promoted  by  some  in-game  behaviours  irrespective  of  their  contribution  to  successful 
attainment of the game’s lusory goal.
Kumiko and Siviwe are playing a friendly set of tennis after school. Both are trying to 
win, so they are occupied in the same Suitsian game.  Siviwe is due to play in a tournament 6
in a month or two, so for him the match is an opportunity to hone his craft. Unbeknownst to 
him, Kumiko has accepted a wager with a mutual friend, that she can win against Siviwe. In 
her hierarchy of goals, higher up than winning the match is the aim of winning the bet, to 
which the match win serves as a means. As a result, she plays in achievement mode, choosing 
 To see that tennis satisfies the Suitsian analysis, start with the prelusory goal of making a 6
tennis ball bounce twice without interruption and add materials and restrictions stepwise until you 
have the constitutive rules for a tennis point.
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only strategies she thinks likely to produce the win, which pushes her play towards efficiency 
and risk avoidance.
Siviwe  also  cares  about  the  win.  But  his  reasons  for  caring  include  the  aim  of 
improving his slice backhand before the tournament. His play is guided by that aim, and he 
looks  for  every  opportunity  to  use  his  slice  to  good  effect.  This  makes  for  riskier,  less 
efficient play, as his topspin backhand is more secure. He loses the set, to Kumiko’s delight, 
but Siviwe does not leave empty handed. Towards the end of the set his slice backhand starts 
clicking into place, and the satisfaction of hitting a few with growing confidence compensates 
for the disappointment of losing the match. Siviwe plays in striving mode because his in-
game activity in pursuit of winning is actively guided by a goal higher up his motivational 
hierarchy that is satisfied by his pursuing the win in a certain way. How he plays is sensitive 
to  features  of  the in-game activity  he values independently of  whether  they are  success-
conducive in the particular match.
At  this  point  all  the  necessary  materials  are  in  hand  for  spelling  out  this  paper’s 
proposal. Here is a first gloss: appreciative engagement is the striving mode of goal-directed 
cognition.
In  fleshing  out  the  analogy,  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  cognitive  activities 
involved in goal-directed thought are of a different order than the practical activities of game 
play. Game play features explicit goals and rules, intentionally taken up by the players. In 
goal-directed cognition, however, cognitive goals need not always be represented by personal 
level mental states (see Bargh 1990) and, even when they are, they need not be within reach 
of consciousness to continue guiding an agent’s cognition (Bos et al. 2008). We can abstract 
away  from  such  differences  by  thinking  of  what  Suitsian  game  play  and  goal-directed 
cognition have in common: both have a task-like structure, proceeding under constraints set 
by the agent’s goals. To capture this common feature, it will be useful to have a minimal 
 22
model of what guidance by a goal consists in. We can borrow such a model from work by 
Imogen Dickie (2015: 95–98). Minimally, on her model, a system realizes guidance when it 
includes the following components:
(A) a state of the system that represents a goal;
(B) a feedback mechanism generating reports on current status; and
(C) moves made by the system that are jointly determined by the goal at (A) and 
the feedback about current status at (B).
Guidance is apt when it leads to goal-fulfilment, which happens when
(D)  the  function  described  at  (C)  tends  towards  outputs  that  minimize  the 
difference  between  the  goal  represented  in  (A)  and  the  current  status 
represented at (B).
Dickie’s model is fully general. It captures the basic features of guidance as it is realized 
across all levels of system complexity, and across both living and inanimate systems. Just as 
it  applies  to  an automated heating system,  so  also  to  an agent’s  goal-directed actions  in 
Suitsian game play.7
In a Suitsian game, at a broad level of description, the in-game activity consists of 
behaviours put out at (C)—for instance: turn shoulders!, adjust grip on racquet!, etc.—in 
response to intentional commitment to the game’s lusory goal and its nested goals at (A)—for 
 Dickie’s guidance system is similar to what Miller, Galanter & Pribram (1960) call a ‘test-7
operate-test-exit (TOTE) unit’. The strategy to be implemented here, of using nested iterations of such 
guidance systems to capture complex goal-guided behaviours, owes a debt to their seminal work in 
cybernetics.
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instance: I will keep the ball in play, I will foil my opponent’s attempts to approach the net by 
placing my shots deep into the court, etc.—and perceptual feedback about the state of the 
game  at  (B)—my  opponent  is  off  balance,  the  ball  is  headed  for  the  left  sideline,  etc. 
Behaviours at (C) are proximally determined by (A) and (B) but need not be fully determined 
by them.
In the striving player, another higher-order system realizes guidance relative to a goal 
higher up in the player’s motivational hierarchy. Call  the goal represented in this second 
system (A*)—for instance: I will practice my slice backhand.  It  has contents satisfied by 
some (A)-guided behaviours rather than others.  Thus the feedback mechanism in the higher-8
order  system,  (B*),  will  makes  the  overall  system sensitive  to  features  of  how  the  (A)-
subsystem  realizes  guidance,  by  reporting  on  which  behaviours  are  output  at  (C)—for 
instance:  are  there  relatively  many  slice  backhands  compared  to  topspin  ones?,  how 
successful are they?, how does their success correlate with features of their execution?, etc. A 
new,  complex  guidance  system arises  in  which  subsequent  behaviours  output  at  (C)  are 
jointly determined by (A), (B), (A*) and (B*). Crucially, in striving play, whether outputs at 
(C) render the guidance realized by the (A*)-subsystem apt is independent of whether those 
same outputs at (C) render the (A)-subsystem’s guidance apt.
The last  paragraph uses the Suitsian game of tennis to illustrate the model of non-
instrumental guidance that striving play instantiates. But with the model in hand, it should be 
clear  that  it  need  not  be  specific  to  practical  activities  dependent  on  the  lusory  attitude. 
Generalizing  to  the  case  of  goal-directed  cognition  is  straightforward:  to  attend  in  the 
appreciative mode is to be engaged in perdurant cognitive activity during which attention is 
 Note that (A*)’s satisfaction conditions will be constrained by whether the outputs of the 8
overall complex system are compatible with guidance by (A), otherwise guidance by (A*) would 
make the lower-order, (A)-guided system break down. This builds the modest submersion requirement 
endorsed at the end of the last section into the overall system.
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guided by commitment to a goal, and the activity constituted by that guidance is modified by 
second-order guidance towards manifestations we find worthwhile for reasons independent of 
their  efficiency  in  attaining  our  first-order  goal.  Thus  a  cognitive  agent  engaged  in 
appreciation has their cognition under guidance realized by a complex motivational structure 
including:
(A) a mental state of either personal or sub-personal level representing a cognitive 
goal;
(B) a feedback mechanism generating reports on progress towards the goal in (A);
(A*) a mental state representing a second-order goal that favours some (A)-guided 
cognitive behaviours of the agent over none, and some particular (A)-guided 
cognitive  behaviours  over  others  irrespective  of  whether  they  are  the  best 
available minimizers of the difference between (A) and (B);
(B*) a feedback mechanism reporting on (A*)-relevant features of ongoing (A)-
guided cognitive behaviours;
(C) cognitive behaviours implemented by the subject’s executive functions, jointly 
determined by (A), (B), (A*) and (B*).
This application of the model to goal-directed cognition provides a picture of the appreciative 
motivational profile as involving attention guided by proximal cognitive goals that are taken 
up by the appreciating agent instrumentally, for the sake of cognitive activities that result 
from attending under the guidance of those goals.  In appreciation our motivation is,  in a 
manner of speaking, inverted: the first-order cognitive goals guiding our attention become 
means to the very attention they guide. We carry out cognitive tasks not primarily for the 
knowledge or information contingent on their completion, but to be engaged in the cognitive 
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activities  that  constitute  our  attempts  to  complete  those  tasks.  Crucially,  this  biases  our 
strategies  for  completing  the  pertinent  tasks  towards  attempts  consisting  of  cognitive 
activities that we care (either intrinsically or instrumentally) to be engaged in.
Consider again George Dickie’s Smith and Jones example from section II, in which 
Jones listens to remember a piece of music’s details for an exam, and Smith listens with no 
such purpose. Dickie’s claim was that they differ in their motives for attending and perhaps 
the degree of their attentiveness, but not with respect to the mode their attention to the music 
exemplifies. What does the motivational inversion model just outlined allow us to say about 
this case?
Recall first that intuitions about such cases are complicated by the fact that agents in 
ordinary circumstances are engaged in ‘numerous, complex, nested, and overlapping’ tasks 
(Mole 2012: 52), and hence, over the course of their attention to the piece, Smith and Jones 
may  each  well  instantiate  a  mixture  of  appreciative  and  non-appreciative  motivation 
(compare footnote 5). We can simplify by focussing only on pertinent differences between 
them. In as much as Jones is guided by the overarching goal of doing well on the exam, his 
attempts to latch onto, classify, memorize, compare, and assess features of the music will 
tend to emerge from and unfold in service of that overarching goal. This does not mean that 
his exam-focussed listening is a case of inattention or distraction from the music; on the 
contrary, the cognitive tasks Jones engages in will pertain directly to features of the piece 
and, if  he cares about the exam, we should expect his listening to be attentive to a high 
degree. But nor does it mean that he is attending to the music in just the same way as Smith. 
Jones’s aim of doing well in the exam makes the payoff of his cognitive efforts contingent on 
the efficient selection and attainment of his proximal cognitive goals. He gets what he wants 
when he gleans information he deems exam-relevant, irrespective of how he gleans it, and he 
will  likely avoid expending cognitive resources on features of the music that fall  outside 
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exam-relevant range, or on inefficient ways of gleaning exam-relevant information. Jones 
attends like Kumiko plays in the tennis example: in achievement mode.
Smith’s attention, on the other hand, is meant to qualify as appreciative on the aesthetic 
attitude theorists’ criterion because, unlike Jones, he has ‘no ulterior motive’ for listening. We 
have seen, however, that this kind of contrastive gloss on appreciative motivation provides 
little actual purchase on what the mode of Smith’s attention to the music consists in. Here the 
motivational inversion account steps into the gap. If Smith really is engaging with the piece 
in the appreciative mode, the account suggests that it must be in virtue of some ongoing, 
goal-directed cognitive activities pertaining to the piece, guided by an overarching second-
order interest of a different sort than that of Jones.
Let us for a moment imagine that the piece was a favourite of Smith’s late grandmother 
and,  as  he  hears  it  now,  it  activates  in  him  the  tacitly  held  goal  to  commemorate  her. 
Inadvertently he finds himself actively trying to latch onto, classify, memorize, compare and 
assess subtle features of the piece. Many of the cognitive tasks that Smith takes up overlap 
with those of Jones: determining how the composer achieves certain effects, picking out the 
number of time signature changes in one part, anticipating the recurrence of a musical theme, 
and so on. But unlike for Jones, the payoff of Smith’s cognitive efforts does not lie in his 
success at memorizing, predicting, or finding things out about the piece. Instead, Smith gets 
what he wants when his attempts to do so transpire in the right ways: when his listening 
proceeds  as  though  through  his  grandmother’s  ears;  when  his  anticipation  of  a  motif 
foregrounds it as representative of her taste; when the manner of his focus on the rhythm in a 
certain passage helps call to mind the memory of her voice humming along.
Alternatively we might envision Smith’s listening as guided by a less personal goal— 
one that is in principle available to anyone who listens. Imagine, for instance, that the piece is 
a composition in counterpoint and Smith wishes simply to be taken in by its complexities and 
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melodic interactions. As he listens, he tries, perhaps deliberately, or perhaps he simply finds 
himself  trying,  to  track  the  individual  melodic  lines.  Again  his  cognitive  efforts  overlap 
substantially with those of Jones, who might also be tracking the individual lines, say, to find 
out (for exam purposes) how a recurring motif is adapted in each voice. But again, the payoff 
of Smith’s efforts do not lie in successfully keeping track of the different voices or rightly 
identifying variations in a recurring motif. In fact, it  is sometimes the manner of Smith’s 
failures to keep track of all the melodies simultaneously—his temporarily losing the thread of 
one voice as he tracks another, only for the former to reemerge delightfully a few bars later—
that gets him the payoff he is after. Smith attends, unlike Jones, in striving mode.
These examples show that it is not the specific contents of Smith’s higher-order goal 
that matter, but rather that, whatever they are, those contents are satisfied by certain first-
order  cognitive  efforts  irrespective  of  their  relative  efficiency  or  actual  success.  The 
assortment of higher-order goals that could render the mode of Smith’s listening appreciative 
can thus vary immensely. They could be goals narrowly focussed on the particular piece, or 
ones that connect Smith’s current listening, say, to his broader interest in the genre (as in the 
counterpoint example), or they could be goals not essentially tied to music or listening at all 
(as in the grandmother example). They could be impersonal goals that derive from formal 
listening  practices  (the  counterpoint  case),  or  they  could  be  goals  grounded  in  deeply 
subjective personal commitments (the grandmother case).
Additionally,  to  count  as  attending  in  the  appreciative  mode,  Smith  need  not  have 
anything that amounts to an intention to appreciate the music or, for that matter, to attend to it 
in the way the motivational inversion account describes. The motivational inversion account 
picks out a mental capacity we have and exercise independently of reflective awareness of it 
or ability to activate it at will. Much like our capacity to see things in the clouds or in marked 
surfaces precedes and provides the foundation for practices of pictorial representation (see 
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Wollheim 1986: 46), so our capacity to attend to things in the appreciative mode precedes and 
grounds the appreciative endeavours and practices that depend upon it.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the model developed in the last section is on the right track, then our cognitive efforts in 
appreciation instantiate the inverted motivation or motivational feedback loop identified in 
the discussion of striving play (section III).  When an appreciator’s cognition proceeds in 
pursuit of proximal cognitive goals (such as to find certain things out about the object of 
appreciation), those goals are ultimately pursued not for any purpose their attainment would 
serve, but rather for the sake of aspects of their attentive pursuit. In this narrow sense, then, 
appreciation does consist in attention ‘for its own sake’.
The motivational inversion account meets Dickie’s challenge to the aesthetic attitude 
theorists.  It  is  formulated in expressly ‘Frankfurtian’ terms pertaining to how attention is 
guided over the course of appreciative episodes. Moreover, it provides a positive rather than 
privative analysis of the appreciative motivational profile, committing to a determinate nested 
structure of goals by which attention is motivated, rather than just ruling out certain kinds of 
motivation. But the account is admittedly unorthodox in several respects.
For a start, whereas appreciative motivation is traditionally made criterial for aesthetic 
mental states (such as pleasures, judgments, an attitude, or responses), it is presented here as 
qualifying  a  distinctive  kind  of  process  or  activity  instead.  The  perdurance  of  cognitive 
episodes—their unfolding over time—is not typically given explanatory import in general 
theorizing about appreciation. At most, it sometimes features in the claim that appreciation or 
aesthetic experience is ‘autotelic’ or ‘self-sustaining’ (for example in Schaeffer 2015, Dokic 
2016). But on its own, the invocation of autotelicity is more notional than illuminating. One 
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way to read the current account is as offering a determinate analysis of what the pertinent 
kind of autotelic motivation amounts to.
The account further deviates from tradition by picking out a motivational profile that is 
‘disinterested’ or ‘non-instrumental’ only in an attenuated sense. It eschews any requirement 
that a cognitive agent must attribute final value to the activity of attending to an object of 
appreciation.  As  in  the  example  involving  Smith’s  grandmother  in  the  last  section,  the 
second-order goal rationalizing and guiding an appreciator’s attention may be completely 
integrated in an idiosyncratic set of personal ends. Token episodes of appreciation may be 
engaged in for entirely instrumental purposes, as long as those purposes are served by being 
engaged in the cognitive activity comprising the episode rather than just by the attainment of 
that activity’s proximal cognitive goals.
Abandonment of a full-fledged, restrictive notion of disinterest is a move with some 
recent precedent in aesthetics. Some philosophers have, for example, been advocating for the 
revival of an older, Platonic tradition in which aesthetic value is considered the object proper 
to loving (and, hence, deeply interested) attitudes (Nehamas 2007; Riggle 2016). Others have 
taken issue with how the disinterest requirement erroneously casts appreciative engagement 
as  a  passive  affair  (Berleant  2016;  Lopes  2018:  159–163).  Yet  another  line  of  criticism 
laments  that  the  valorization  of  disinterest  in  aesthetics  has  severed  the  arts—and  our 
appreciative engagement with them—from the broader human activities  from which they 
arose  in  the  first  place,  and  from  which  they  derive  their  meaning  and  significance 
(Wolterstorff 2015).
The motivational  inversion account  is  rooted in  sympathy with  these concerns,  but 
ultimately offers a strategy for sidestepping the dispute about disinterest. On the one hand it 
accommodates the critics of disinterest on all fronts. It brooks no prohibition on personal 
concerns and passions (including loving attitudes) prompting and helping to guide an agent’s 
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attention in token appreciative episodes; it conceives appreciation as involving active, task-
like exercises of cognitive agency; and it integrates appreciative motivation with the broader 
motives underlying our practical projects outside the confines of the gallery and concert hall. 
Nonetheless,  the  account  also  allows  the  proponents  of  disinterest  to  maintain  that 
appreciative episodes are non-instrumentally motivated in the substantive (if non-traditional) 
sense captured by the motivational inversion model. Live questions thus remain about the 
extent  to  which  the  model  is  compatible  with,  or  even  fitted  to,  the  theories  of  some 
proponents of disinterest such as Schopenhauer and Bullough.
Finally, as conceived in this paper, the appreciative mode of attention is ubiquitous. The 
psychological kind picked out by the proposed account can be instantiated in attention to any 
manner of  item or task,  ranging from things of great  aesthetic significance to the utterly 
mundane or frivolous. This forestalls the temptation to draw an essential connection, as the 
aesthetic attitude theorists did, between appreciative motivation and the aesthetic. But this is 
as it should be. The aim of an account of appreciative attention should be to explain why the 
values of things—both aesthetic and otherwise—come to fruition in experience when we 
attend to them appreciatively.9
 My thanks for very helpful comments on (in some cases multiple) earlier drafts of this paper 9
to Anthony Cross, Sina Fazelpour, Alex King, Dominic Lopes, Irene Martínez Marín, Chris Mole, Thi 
Nguyen, Sophia Sideris, and the audience at Camp Aesthetics 2018 at UVU Capitol Reef Field 
Station. Thanks also for invaluable discussion of some of the main ideas to Aleksey Balotskiy, Jasper 
Heaton, and audiences at Uppsala University’s Higher Seminar in Aesthetics, the 2018 BSA 
Conference at St Anne’s College, Oxford, and UBC Philosophy’s graduate colloquium.
 31
REFERENCES
Bargh,  J.  A.  (1990)  ‘Goal  ≠  Intent:  Goal-Directed  Thought  and  Behavior  Are  Often 
Unintentional’, Psychological Inquiry, 1/3: 248–77.
Berleant, A. (2016) Re-thinking Aesthetics. New York: Routledge.
Bos,  M.  W.,  Dijksterhuis,  A and Van Baaren,  R.  B.  (2008)  ‘On the  goal-dependency of 
unconscious thought’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44/4: 1114–20.
Bullough,  E.  1912.  ‘“Psychical  Distance” as  a  Factor  in Art  and an Aesthetic  Principle’, 
British Journal of Psychology, 5: 87–117. 
Christoff, K., Irving, Z. C., Fox, K. C. R., Spreng, R. N. and Andrews-Hanna, J. R. (2016) 
‘Mind-wandering as spontaneous thought: a dynamic framework’, Neuroscience,  17: 
718–31.
Davidson, D. (1963) ‘Actions, reasons, and causes’, Journal of Philosophy, 60/23: 685–700. 
Dickie, G. (1964) ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 
1/1: 56–65.
Dickie, I. (2015) Fixing Reference. Oxford: OUP.
Dokic, J. (2016) ‘Aesthetic Experience as a Metacognitive Feeling? A Dual-Aspect View’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 116/1: 69–88.
Frankfurt, H. (1978) ‘The problem of action’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15/2: 157–
62.
Irving, Z. C. (2016) ‘Mind-wandering is unguided attention: accounting for the “purposeful” 
wanderer’, Philosophical Studies, 173: 547–71.
Iseminger,  G.  (2005)  ‘The  Aesthetic  State  of  Mind’,  in  M.  Kieran  (ed.)  Contemporary 
Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, 98–112. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kagan, S. (1998) ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’, Journal of Ethics, 2: 277–97.
Kant, I. (1790/2000). Critique of the Power of Judgement. Trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kemp, G. (1999) ‘The Aesthetic Attitude’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 39/4: 392–99.
Korsgaard, C. (1983) ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, Philosophical Review, 92: 169–95.
Levinson, J. (2016) ‘Toward an Adequate Conception of Aesthetic Experience’ in Aesthetic 
Pursuits: Essays in Philosophy of Art, 28–31. Oxford: OUP.
Lind,  R.  W.  (1980)  ‘Attention  and  the  Aesthetic  Object’,  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  Art 
Criticism, 39/2: 131–42.
Lopes, D. M. (2018) Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value. Oxford: OUP.
Matthen, M. (2017) ‘The Pleasures of Art’, Australasian Philosophical Review, 1/1: 6–28.
Matthen, M. (2018) ‘New Prospects for Aesthetic Hedonism’, in J. A. McMahon (ed.) Social 
Aesthetics and Moral Judgment: Pleasure, Reflection and Accountability, 13–33. New 
York: Routledge.
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E. and Pribram, K. H. (1960) Plans and the Structure of Behavior. 
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
 32
Mole, C. (2011) Attention is Cognitive Unison. An essay in cognitive psychology. Oxford: 
OUP.
Nanay, B. (2016) Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: OUP.
Nehamas, A. (2007). Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nguyen, C. T. (Forthcoming). Games: Agency as Art. OUP.
Riggle, N. (2016) ‘On the Interest in Beauty and Disinterest’, Philosopher’s Imprint, 16/9: 1–
14.
Schaeffer,  J.(2015) ‘Aesthetic Relationship,  Cognition,  and the Pleasures of  Art’,  in P.  F. 
Bundgaard  and  F.  Stjernfelt  (eds.)  Investigations  into  the  Phenomenology  and  the 
Ontology of the Work of Art. New York: Springer.
Schopenhauer, Arthur (1819/2010) The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1. Trans. J. 
Norman and A. Welchman. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Setiya, K. (2003) ‘Explaining Action’, Philosophical Review, 112/3: 339–393.
Shelley,  J.  (2017)  ‘The  Concept  of  the  Aesthetic’,  in  E.  N.  Zalta  (ed.)  The  Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Winter 2017 edn. (First version published in Fall 2009 
edn.) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/aesthetic-concept/>
Stecker, R. (2006) ‘Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Value’, Philosophy Compass, 1/1: 1–
10.
Stolnitz, J. (1960) Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Suits, B. (1978) The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press.
Wollheim,  R.  (1986)  ‘Imagination  and  Pictorial  Understanding’,  Proceedings  of  the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 60/1: 45-60.
Wolterstorff, N. (2015) Art Rethought: the Social Practices of Art. Oxford: OUP.
Zangwill, Nick (1992) ‘Unkantian notions of disinterest’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 32/2: 
149–52.
University of British Columbia, Canada
 33
